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ABSTRACT
The run on the sale and repurchase market (“run on repo”) was at the nexus of the Financial Crisis of 2007-
2009. Up until now, the economics literature has not studied the effect of sale and repurchase agreement 
(“repo”) haircuts on bank stock returns using an empirical economic approach. I utilize private repo haircut 
data from 2007Q1-2009Q1 supplemented with bank stock returns, total reserve balances, and market rate of 
returns and risk-free rate of returns data to trace the path of crisis from repurchase agreements into a market 
that had no connection to housing. In linear model regressions, I find that repo haircuts on BBB+/A Corpo-
rates, AA-AAA Corporates, A-AAA ABS-Auto/CC/SL, AA-AAA ABS-RMBS/CMBS, AA-AAA CLO, and 
Unpriced CLO/CDO are negatively associated with bank stock returns during the Financial Crisis. The results 
suggest that there is an underlying force driving the co-movement of bank stock returns with repo haircuts.
The Run on Repo and Bank Stock Returns
By Madison Marie Battaglia1
1Department of Economics, Yale University
INTRODUCTION
The Financial Crisis of 2007-2009 was a banking panic in the 
sale and repurchase agreement market, a multi-trillion dollar mar-
ket that dramatically shrank with the “run on repo”: a securitized 
banking system run driven by the withdrawal of sale and repur-
chase agreements (“repo”). Net repo financing collapsed by about 
$1.3 trillion by the first quarter of 2009, down more than half of its 
pre-Crisis total in the second quarter of 2007 (Gorton and Metrick 
2012). Significant effects of this run on repo remain a gray area 
because of the lightly regulated, or lack thereof, institutions’ gap 
in comprehensive data. In this paper, I aim to establish the impact 
of the sale and repurchase agreement market on bank performance 
during the Financial Crisis. I supplement a private dataset with the 
best available official data sources to study the effect of 9 different 
categories of asset classes of collateral repurchase agreement hair-
cuts on bank stock returns. The economics literature has not looked 
at the bank stock returns effects of repo haircuts. In linear model re-
gressions, I provide evidence that repo haircuts on BBB+/A Corpo-
rates, AA-AAA Corporates, A-AAA ABS-Auto/CC/SL, AA-AAA 
ABS-RMBS/CMBS, AA-AAA CLO, and Unpriced CLO/CDO are 
negatively associated with bank stock returns during the Financial 
Crisis. My analysis suggests that there is an underlying force driv-
ing the co-movement of bank stock returns with repo haircuts.
Increasing home ownership rates has been identified as a key goal 
for the U.S. Government via modern housing finance during the 
Great Depression with the New Deal’s National Housing Act of 
1934 (Fishback, Horrace, and Kantor 2001). The subprime mort-
gage market was a successful financial innovation, aimed at pro-
moting access to mortgage finance in order to own homes to dis-
proportionately poor and minority people, that originated a total 
of about $2.5 trillion of subprime mortgages in 2001-2006, but its 
necessary interlinked unique security design resulted in a loss of in-
formation to investors and subsequent Panic of 2007 (Gorton 2008; 
Inside Mortgage Finance 2007). In 2006 and 2007, 80 percent of 
subprime mortgages were financed through securitization (Gorton 
2009). The sale and repurchase market is a very large, short-term 
market that provides financing for a wide range of securitization 
activities and financial institutions.
The 2007-2009 Financial Crisis was special because it was a run on 
repo: a system-wide bank run in the securitized banking system that 
was driven by the withdrawal of repurchase agreements, instead of 
a bank run in the traditional banking system that is driven by the 
withdrawal of deposits. Traditional banking involves making and 
holding loans, with insured demand deposits as the main source 
of funds. Securitized banking involves packaging and reselling 
loans, with repo agreements as the main source of funds. Accord-
ing to Gorton and Metrick (2009), securitized banking activities 
were central to the operations of firms formerly known as “invest-
ment banks” (e.g. Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Morgan Stanley, 
Merrill Lynch), but they also play a role at commercial banks, as a 
supplement to traditional banking activities of firms like Citigroup, 
J.P. Morgan, and Bank of America. The Crisis was not only unique 
because of where the run on repo spread, but also the dynamics of 
who facilitated it. Gorton and Metrick (2012) find that the run on 
repo was predominantly driven by the flight of foreign financial 
institutions, domestic and offshore hedge funds, and other unregu-
lated cash pools.
In 2007, the total size of the repo market was about $12 trillion 
(counting repo and reverse repo), including $2.5 trillion of tripartite 
repo, compared to total assets in the U.S. banking system of $10 
trillion (Geithner 2008).1 According to Hördahl and King (2008), 
“the (former) top US investment banks funded roughly half of their 
assets using repo markets, with additional exposure due to off-bal-
ance sheet financing of their customers”. Securitized banking rates 
have been rising, with the ratio of broker-dealer (investment) banks 
total assets to traditional banking banks’ total assets having grown 
1 In tripartite repo, a custodian bank or clearing organization acts as an interme-
diary between the two repo parties. There are no data that quantify the amount of 
bilateral repo (Gorton 2009).
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from about six percent in 1990 to a peak of 30 percent in 2007, ac-
cording to Federal Flow of Funds data (Gorton and Metrick 2009).2 
In 2007, the United States Bankruptcy Court upheld a new stance on 
repurchase agreements, ruling that repurchase agreements involv-
ing mortgage loans are protected under the safe harbor provisions 
of the Bankruptcy Code, but servicing rights are not (Schweitzer, 
Grosshandler, and Gao 2008); in the case that one party defaults, 
the non-defaulting party is allowed to terminate the contract and 
keep the cash or bonds.
The Financial Crisis that began in August 2007 is analogous to the 
banking panics of the 19th century in which depositors en masse 
ran to their banks to withdraw cash in exchange of demand and sav-
ings deposits. Since the banking system had to suspend convertibil-
ity because the cash had been lent out and loans were illiquid, the 
clearinghouses issued loan certificates to member banks in place 
of currency for the payment of depositors’ claims (Gorton 1985). 
The banking system in the 19th century was insolvent because of 
the discount on these certificates. The 2007-2009 Financial Crisis 
is similar in that contagion led to withdrawals in the form of un-
precedented high repo haircuts and even the cessation of repo lend-
ing on many forms of collateral (Gorton and Metrick 2009). The 
banking system in 2008 was insolvent because several large firms 
went bankrupt, were forced into rescue, or required government 
assistance to stay in business.
Traditional banking runs were ended in the United States in the 
1930s with the introduction of deposit insurance and discount-win-
dow lending by the Federal Reserve (Gorton and Metrick 2009). 
However, when deposit insurance was capped at $100,000 per ac-
count, institutions such as pension funds, mutual funds, states and 
municipalities, and cash-rich nonfinancial companies lacked easy 
access to safe, interest-earning, short-term investments; the securi-
tized banking system provides a solution to this problem (Gorton 
et al. 2010).
Safe assets play a critical role in the economy. A safe asset can be 
used to transact without fear of adverse selection because it is al-
ways taken at face value with no questions asked (NQA), meaning 
a safe asset is relatively immune to the costly production of private 
information about its value (Holmström 2015). Dang, Gorton, and 
Holmström (2015) define this attribute as information insensitivity. 
Treasury yields are reduced by 73 basis points, on average, from 
1926 to 2008 due to the convenience yield in the form of both the 
liquidity and safety attributes of Treasuries, and the existence of a 
convenience yield implies that U.S. Treasuries are non-Ricardian 
(Barro 1974; Gorton and Ordoñez 2013; Krishnamurthy and Viss-
ing-Jorgensen 2012). The Financial Crisis of 2007–2009 showed, 
once again, that privately produced safe assets, that is short-term 
debt like sale and repurchase agreements, are not always safe; 
short-term safe debt is subject to runs, threatening systemic col-
lapse of the financial system and having important implications for 
macroeconomics and monetary policy (Gorton 2017).
2 Federal Reserve Flow of Funds data on repo only cover the U.S. primary dealers 
and do not capture the increasing share of repo in total financing for each kind of 
bank. Therefore, the Federal Reserve numbers understate the increased role of repo 
finance over time.
Banks may act as secret keepers to decrease the risk of contagion 
spreading from the repo market to the stock market. Banks produce 
money that is not sensitive to information, either public or private-
ly produced, even when it must be backed by risky assets that re-
quire evaluation by being opaque; however, the trade-off between 
less safe liquidity and more risky liquidity determines which firms 
choose to fund projects through banks and which ones through cap-
ital markets (Dang et al. 2017). The idea that it may be optimal 
to keep information secret is not new and has been articulated in 
the early release of information destroying future insurance oppor-
tunities, a model in which banks acquire information before de-
positors acquire it, a bank’s preferences to keep information secret 
even though it must then use a non-contingent deposit contract, and 
diversified intermediation (e.g. banks) mitigating information ap-
propriability problems (Breton 2006; Diamond and Dybvig 1983; 
Hirshleifer 1971; Kaplan 2006). Researchers have concluded that 
debt-on-debt is the optimal structure of contracts to solve the prob-
lem of endogenous private information acquisition as well as the 
exogenous arrival of public news; this is because debt is least in-
formation sensitive and a collapse of trade in debt funding markets 
(e.g. a financial crisis) is a discontinuous event that occurs when 
public news about fundamentals makes information insensitive 
debt to become information sensitive (Dang, Gorton, and Holm-
ström 2015). In addition, banks structure their balance sheets to 
take advantage of the imperfect correlation between deposit with-
drawals and loan commitment takedowns, resulting in synergies 
between the two activities (Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein 2002).
A large part of the accounting literature has focused on the potential 
costs of firms’ disclosure, specifically in stock markets. Diamond 
and Verrecchia (1991) demonstrate that revealing public informa-
tion to reduce information asymmetry can reduce a firm’s cost of 
capital, but it can have the opposite effect by reducing liquidity in 
the stock market. Banks have always been opaque and it is contin-
gent on examiners to uncover secrets. Studies show economically 
significant bank stock price and volume reactions as a result of the 
quarterly public release of Call Reports; strong negative bank stock 
price and abnormal return effects as a result of bank examination 
downgrades or dividend reductions; and significantly positive ab-
normal returns as a result of the SEC mandate that bank holding 
company CEOs must certify the accuracy of their financial state-
ments (Badertscher, Burks, and Easton 2018; Berger and Davies 
1998; Bessler and Nohel 1996; Hirtle 2006). In particular, the re-
sponses to the Financial Crisis maintained bank anonymity as emer-
gency lending facilities were carefully designed, with complicated 
and opaque asset-backed securities (ABS) and mortgage-backed 
securities (MBS) backing sale and repurchase agreements, to keep 
bank borrowers from having their identities revealed (Dang et al. 
2017). Further, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
adopted extraordinary measures during the recent financial crisis, 
banning the short selling of 797 financial stocks for the 14 trading 
days from September 19th through October 8th of 2008; the ban 
was intended to prevent speculators from placing excessive down-
ward pressure on the stocks of already troubled financial firms (Re-
lease No. 34-58592 / September 18, 2008).3
3 In an amendment to the order, the SEC gave authority to the exchanges to add 
additional stocks to the banned list. Altogether, over 1,000 stocks were brought 
under the ban within several days of the order (Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion 2008b).
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This paper proceeds as follows. In Section II, I provide background 
for my analysis of sale and repurchase agreements. In Section III, I 
describe the data sources, present summary statistics, and illustrate 
the trends in the data on repo haircuts, bank stock returns, total re-
serve balances, and market and risk-free rate of returns. In Section 
IV, I explain my econometric methodology and Section V reports 
the main empirical results of my analysis. In Section VI, I discuss 
my arguments and conclude the paper. In the Appendix, I define 
some of the paper’s terminology and the asset classes of collateral 
that are used in my empirical analysis.
BACKGROUND
There are a few differences between traditional banking and secu-
ritized banking. The classic picture of the financial intermediation 
of mortgages by the traditional banking system is as follows: (step 
1) depositors transfer money to the bank in return for a checking 
or savings account that can be withdrawn at any time, interest rates 
on deposits, and deposits insured by the government; (step 2) the 
bank loans these funds to a borrower in return for a promised re-
payment through a mortgage on a property; and (step 3) the bank 
holds this mortgage and other non-mortgage loans on its balance 
sheet in adherence of minimum reserve levels set by regulators. 
The securitized banking system is a version of the above and works 
as follows: (step 1) investors transfer money to the bank in return 
for collateral; (step 2) the bank outsources underwriting loans to 
a direct lender; (step 3) the bank securitizes most of the mortgage 
loans to outside investors; and (step 4) the bank uses the outputs 
of the securitization as collateral, creating a cycle that ultimately 
breaks down during the Financial Crisis.
In this paper, I address the implication of one important difference 
between the traditional banking and securitized banking systems: 
sale and repurchase agreements. In step 2 of the securitized banking 
system, the deposit-collateral transaction takes the form of a repo 
agreement.4 A repurchase agreement is a financial contract in which 
the bank (i.e. borrower) transfers specified securities (i.e. collater-
al) to the depositor (i.e. lender) in exchange for cash and the bank 
agrees to repurchase the securities shortly afterwards, usually at a 
slightly higher price. The term at which a repo agreement is typical-
ly set to mature is overnight. The repo rate is the amount the inves-
tor charges for the deposit, expressed as a percentage of the princi-
pal. My paper focuses on the repo haircut: the percentage difference 
between an asset’s market value and the amount that can be used 
as collateral for a loan.5 The size of this markdown is largely based 
on the risk of the underlying asset. Gorton and Metrick (2009) find 
that changes in the LB-OIS spread, a proxy for counterparty risk, 
was strongly correlated with changes in credit spread and repo rates 
for securitized bonds; accordingly, concerns about the liquidity of 
markets for the bonds used as collateral led to increases in repo 
haircuts.6 In other words, riskier assets receive larger haircuts.
4 For background on the repo market, see Bank for International Settlements 
(1999) and Corrigan and de Terán (2007).
5 A haircut is defined as , where D is the amount lent to the bank by the 
lender and C is the collateral.
6 The LIB-OIS is the spread between the LIBOR rate (for unsecured interbank 
borrowing) and the OIS, the rate on an overnight interest swap (a proxy for the 
For decades, repurchase agreements have been recognized as a form 
of money and considered a part of the money supply (Federal Re-
serve Bank of New York 2008); the Federal Reserve counted repo 
in the monetary aggregate M3, which was discontinued in 2006.7 
Securities that function as money have specific properties of being 
short term debt and backed by diversified portfolios, which Gorton 
and Pennacchi (1990) and Dang, Gorton, and Holmström (2010b) 
describe as information-insensitive securities. Banks try to produce 
these safe securities with the purpose of not much change in their 
value and no benefit of private information speculation about their 
value. The Financial Crisis was a problem with a specific type of 
private money creation, repos, in which “liquidity dries up” be-
cause of a “loss of confidence” (Gorton and Metrick 2010).
One important purpose of repos is that they can be rehypothecated. 
Hypothecate means to pledge collateral. Rehypothecation is when a 
secured party, such as a dealer, a bank, or other financial institution, 
repledges collateral pledged in one transaction with an unrelated 
third party in an unrelated transaction (Johnson 1997). Gorton and 
Metrick (2010) explain that rehypothecated collateral is associated 
with money velocity because the same collateral can support multi-
ple transactions, in the same way that one dollar of cash can lead to 
a multiple of demand deposits at a bank. This cash like function of 
repo is another example of how repo acts as money.
The repo market can be split into two main segments: tri-party repo 
and bilateral repo. In tri-party repo, the clearing banks act as an 
intermediary, facilitating settlement between the two parties in the 
repo transaction; the bilateral repo market has investors and col-
lateral providers directly exchange money and securities, absent a 
clearing bank (Securities Industry and Financial Markets Associa-
tion (SIFMA) 2020). The tri-party institutions are highly regulat-
ed and thus have comprehensive data. However, much of bilateral 
repo involves unregulated institutions (e.g. offshore institutions), 
so there is a significant data gap. Survey evidence from the Bond 
Market Association (2005) finds that bilateral repo was about three 
times as large as tri-party repo in 2004. In Gorton and Metrick’s 
(2012) research, they provide an answer to “who ran on repo?”: 
“the statistical discrepancy [between the Federal Reserve Flow-of-
Funds data and the Bond Market Association survey evidence] ran 
on repo”.8 That is, the run was predominantly driven by the flight 
of foreign financial institutions, domestic and offshore hedge funds, 
and other unregulated cash pools (Gorton and Metrick 2012).
Securities dealers are at the heart of the repo market as they operate 
as intermediaries in both the aforementioned segments. Those addi-
risk-free rate) (Gorton and Metrick 2009).
7 “On March 23, 2006, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem will cease publication of the M3 monetary aggregate. The Board will also 
cease publishing the following components: large-denomination time deposits, 
repurchase agreements (RPs), and Eurodollars.…M3 does not appear to convey 
any additional information about economic activity that is not already embodied 
in M2 and has not played a role in the monetary policy process for many years. 
Consequently, the Board judged that the costs of collecting the underlying data and 
publishing M3 outweigh the benefits” (Federal Reserve 2005).
8 See Federal Reserve Flow-of-Funds L.207 Federal Funds and Security Repur-
chase Agreements (2019) and Bond Market Association (2005) survey evidence.
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Table 1. Summary Statistics. This table reports the summary statistics for repo haircuts, Panel A; bank stock returns, Panel B; total reserve balances, 
Panel C; and market rate of return and risk-free rate of return. For each series, I show summary statistics of mean and standard deviation for the 
whole period and four subperiods: first half of 2007, second half of 2007, all of 2007, all of 2008. All variables given in this table are defined in the 
Appendix. The samples are restricted to observations that are used in the one-factor linear model regression.
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tional market participants who lend cash collateralized by securities 
are mostly comprised of large, institutional investors of cash pools 
that include asset managers, pension funds, insurance companies, 
securities lenders, and money market funds (Aguiar, Bookstaber, 
and Wipf 2014; Pozsar 2011). Those other market participants who 
seek funding are levered investors like hedge funds (Aguiar, Book-
staber, and Wipf 2014). Also, securities dealers intermediate be-
tween those looking to earn extra yield by lending securities, such 
as pension, sovereign wealth, mutual, exchange-traded, and insur-
ance funds, and those looking to borrow specific securities, such 
as hedge funds and broker-dealers (Baklanova, Copeland, and Mc-
Caughrin 2015). Furthermore, the Federal Reserve has conducted 
temporary open market operations by using repo and reverse repo 
agreements with the intention to manage the supply of total reserve 
balances such that the federal funds rate is kept within target policy 
ranges deemed appropriate by the Federal Open Market Committee 
(FOMC) (Federal Reserve Bank of New York 2014).9 
In the repo market, the collateral often consists of securitized 
bonds, which are the liabilities of a special purpose vehicle (SPV). 
A SPV finances a large portfolio of loans (e.g. home mortgages, 
auto loans, credit card receivables, and student loans) by issuing in-
vestment-grade securities (i.e. bonds with ratings in the categories 
of AAA, AA, A, BBB) with different seniority (i.e. tranches) in the 
capital markets. Gorton and Souleles (2007) conclude that SPVs 
exist in large part to reduce bankruptcy costs. The securitization of 
non-mortgage loans creates asset-backed securities (ABS), which 
are residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) when they are 
backed by asset pools of residential mortgages and commercial 
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) when they are backed by as-
set pools of commercial mortgages. Collateralized debt obligations 
(CDO) and collateralized loan obligations (CLO) are SPVs that 
issue different tranches of risk in the capital markets and use the 




My data collection process starts when Andrew Metrick, Janet L. 
Yellen Professor of Finance and Management of Yale School of 
Management, who has done extensive research into financial stabil-
ity, provides a private dataset of 844 daily repo haircut observations 
on each of 9 different categories of asset classes of collateral from 
2005Q4-2009Q1. The data is extracted from one broker dealer en-
gaging in repo transactions with other banks in the interbank mar-
ket regarding the independent variables of interest, repo haircuts 
for BBB+/A Corporates, AA-AAA Corporates, A-AAA ABS-Auto/
CC/SL (auto/credit cards/student loans), AA-AAA ABS-RMBS/
CMBS, <AA ABS-RMBS/CMBS, Unpriced ABS/MBS/All Sub-
Prime, AA-AAA CLO, AA-AAA CDO, and Unpriced CLO/CDO. 
9 In accordance with the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Pro-
tection Act, the Federal Reserve now provides transaction-level data on its repo 
and reverse repo trades with primary dealers (Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
2020); these data complement operational data also available from the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York.
Repo haircuts are not uniform across asset classes because repo 
haircuts are a function of the default probabilities of the two parties 
to the transaction and the information sensitivity to the collateral 
(Dang, Gorton, and Holmström 2010b). The study’s strengths are 
that the bank that provided the data anonymously is a large, well-
known institution and I know of no other large datasets of repo 
haircuts.10 Its limitation is the data are not representative because I 
do not have data from other banks.
I subset the data for bi-weekly observations to sync with the total 
reserve balances data, where weekly data observations repeat for 
2 consecutive weeks. Additionally, while Andrew Metrick’s initial 
dataset goes back to 2005Q4, my dataset includes bi-weekly repo 
haircuts in 2007Q1 and after to coincide with the timeline of the 
Financial Crisis. The final subset sample of repo haircuts consists 
of 54 bi-weekly repo haircut observations on each of the 9 differ-
ent categories of asset classes of collateral from 2007Q1-2009Q1. 
Finally, I create matched samples with the 3 other data sources that 
follow and then I merge the 4 datasets to comprise my main dataset.
Table 1 displays summary statistics.11 Throughout Table 1 there are 
five periods shown: the whole period (January 2007-January 2009), 
the first half of 2007, the second half of 2007, all of 2007, and 
“all of 2008” (which also includes January 2009). Panel A shows 
repo haircuts in the interbank repo market. Different categories of 
collateral are shown in each row: BBB+/A Corporates, AA-AAA 
Corporates, A-AAA ABS-Auto/CC/SL, AA-AAA ABS-RMBS/
CMBS, <AA ABS-RMBS/CMBS, Unpriced ABS/MBS/All Sub-
Prime, AA-AAA CLO, AA-AAA CDO, Unpriced CLO/CDO. The 
last row in Panel A gives summary data for the Repo-Haircut In-
dex, which is defined as the equally-weighted average haircut for 
all nine asset classes. For each category, the mean and standard 
deviation of the repo haircuts during the respective time periods 
are shown.
From these statistics I can identify important trends leading up to 
the Crisis. In general, the first half of 2007 looks “normal” in the 
sense that it is prior to the panic. For example, the third category of 
A-AAA ABS-Auto/CC/SL has an average repo haircut of zero in 
the first half of 2007. However, looking at the second half of 2007, 
it is clear that the effects of the Crisis hit when the repo haircut 
jumps to 8 percent. Concerns about the liquidity of markets for the 
bonds used as collateral led to increases in repo haircuts, which 
coupled with declining asset values resulted in an effectively insol-
vent U.S. banking system for the first time since the Great Depres-
sion (Gorton and Metrick 2009). The repo haircuts in each category 
follow a pattern of a rise in the second half of 2007 and a dramatic 
increase in 2008. In particular, the Repo-Haircut Index rises from 
zero in the first half of 2007 to nearly 30 percent at the peak of the 
Crisis in the last quarter of 2008. The rise in repo haircuts consti-
tutes the run on repo.
Repo haircuts are zero for all asset classes in the pre-Crisis period, 
but both Figure 1 and Figure 2 essentially document the unfold-
ing of the panic in the timeline of the Crisis. Figure 1 groups the 
10 The Bank for International Settlements (2010) has a small amount of sur-
vey-based data from June 2007 to June 2009.
11 All variables given in Table 1 are defined in the Appendix.
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categories by their ratings into investment-grade corporate bonds 
(BBB+/A Corporates, AA-AAA Corporates), non-subprime related 
(A-AAA ABS-Auto/CC/SL, AA-AAA ABS-RMBS/CMBS, <AA 
ABS-RMBS/CMBS, AA-AAA CLO), and subprime related (Un-
priced ABS/MBS/All Sub-Prime, AA-AAA CDO, Unpriced CLO/
CDO). A notable dynamic in the chronology of the Crisis is that 
there was not a single shock that led to one jump in the repo hair-
cuts, but a prolonged series of increases in repo haircuts, with the 
failure of Lehman Brothers being the tipping point of this build-up 
of systemic fragility (Gorton, Metrick, and Xie 2014). In partic-
ular, Figure 1 confirms that haircuts were higher on subprime re-
lated asset classes and these assets were eventually not acceptable 
as collateral in repo agreements. In other words, the repo haircuts 
reached an unprecedented 100 percent.
The panic portrayed in Figure 1 is the securitized bank run on repo. 
If the assumption is a benchmark repo market size of $10 trillion, 
then an increase in the Repo-Haircut Index from zero (pre-Crisis) 
to 20 percent during the Crisis results in a $2 trillion shortage of 
repo market financing.12 In theory, if an asset has a market value of 
$100 and a bank sells it for $80 with an agreement to repurchase it 
for $88, then the repo rate is 10 percent [(88-80)/80] and the haircut 
is 20 percent [(100-80)/100]. Further, selling the underlying collat-
eral to raise the $2 trillion difference in the Crisis drives asset prices 
down, which then reinforces the cycle: lower prices, less collateral, 
more concerns about solvency, and ever increasing haircuts (Gor-
ton and Metrick 2009).
A loss of confidence is found with the significant haircuts faced 
by the non-subprime related group that has nothing to do with 
subprime mortgages, as Figure 1 shows. The only caveat is its 
exposure to securitization. This loss of confidence can be driven 
by psychological phenomena. The heightened uncertainty of sub-
prime increases feelings of fear, and the subsequent anxiety effect 
12 $10 trillion is an estimate based on the total assets in the regulated banking 
sector (Geithner 2008).
results in more conservative behavior that spreads throughout the 
banking system via contagion and informational social influence. 
This misperception of a group (i.e. market) norm that leads peo-
ple acting at variance with their private beliefs out of a concern 
for the social consequences is referred to as pluralistic ignorance. 
The bias towards other categories of asset classes is due to a repre-
sentativeness heuristic, which is the process whereby judgements 
of likelihood (i.e. risk) are based on assessments of similarity be-
tween group prototypes (i.e. subprime). Figure 2 confirms this loss 
of confidence with the comparison between the average haircut on 
structured products and the average haircut on investment-grade 
corporate bonds.13 Corporate bonds, despite no contagious effect 
of subprime related, see a haircut increase from zero to 25 per-
cent, consistent with the notion that “subprime risk, even though 
not large by itself, has been spread inside and outside the banking 
system, globally and domestically, and no one knows where it is” 
(Gorton 2010).
Bank Stock Returns Data
Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) is one of the main data 
sources for my analysis, specifically the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) databases. CRSP maintains the largest 
and most comprehensive proprietary historical databases in stock 
market research, with daily stock prices, dividends, and shares 
outstanding data for companies listed on the NYSE, AMEX, and 
NASDAQ. Specifically, I use publicly available panel data from 
the CRSP U.S. Stock Database. The initial panel data was collected 
using the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Division of 
Corporate Finance Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code 
List, which indicates that company’s type of business. I used the 
SIC Codes for National Commercial Banks (6021), State Commer-
cial Banks (6022), and Commercial Banks, Not Elsewhere Classi-
fied (6029) to collect the daily holding period returns for 366 banks 
from 2007Q1 through 2009Q1. Some banks were missing a few ob-
13 Structured products include A-AAA ABS-Auto/CC/SL, AA-AAA ABS-RMBS/
CMBS, <AA ABS-RMBS/CMBS, Unpriced ABS/MBS/All Sub-Prime, AA-AAA 
CLO, AA-AAA CDO, and Unpriced CLO/CDO.
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Figure 1. Repo Haircuts on Different Categories of Asset Classes. 
Investment-grade corporate bonds include BBB+/A Corporates and AA-
AAA Corporates. Non-surprime related include -AAA ABS-Auto/CC/SL, 
AA-AAA ABS-RMBS-CMBS, < AA ABS-RMBS/CMBS, and AA-AAA CLO. 
Subprime related include Unpriced ABS/MBS/All Sub-Prime, AA-AAA 
CDO, and Unpriced CLO/CDO.
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Figure 2. Average Haircut on Structured Products Versus Average 
Haircut on Investment-Grade Corporate Bonds. The loss in confidence is 
confirmed with the comparison between the average haircut on structured 
products and the average haircut on investment-grade corporate bonds.
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servations due to the date of the private company going public, and 
vice versa, so the total observations for all banks is 160,489. Stock 
returns have shared variation due to stock-market risk factors (i.e. 
overall market factor and factors related to firm size and book-to-
market equity), and they are linked to bond returns through shared 
variation in the bond-market risk factors (i.e. maturity and default 
risks) (Fama and French 1993). This database is characterized by 
its unique permanent identifiers that allow for clean and accurate 
backtesting, time-series and event studies, measurement of perfor-
mance, accurate benchmarking, and securities analysis. It contains 
end-of-day and month-end prices on all listed NYSE, AMEX, and 
NASDAQ common stocks along with basic market indices, and in-
cludes the most comprehensive distribution information available, 
with the most accurate total return calculations.
I manually construct the dependent variable of interest from the 
raw data, the bi-weekly holding period returns. Subsequently, I 
manually construct the excess return on the bank stock (Ri – Rf) 
by subtracting the risk-free rate of return from the bank stock rate 
of return. The calculation for bi-weekly holding period returns in-
volves making sure the timing with the final repo haircut data is 
correct. The academic convention for calculating the bi-weekly 
holding period returns is as follows: for 2007Q1 through 2009Q1, 
collect the closing prices for trading days for the 366 banks. Then, 
use bi-weekly prices to calculate bi-weekly returns for each bank. 
In this way, the bi-weekly returns correspond to each respective 
bank in the panel data.
Further modification of the bi-weekly bank stock returns is needed 
to provide a more accurate avenue for my analysis. Due to the ef-
fects a company’s significant public announcements have on their 
stock price, I omitted observations with bi-weekly returns less than 
-50 percent and greater than 50 percent to get rid of outliers. Con-
sequently, the filter enables me to remove the idiosyncratic shocks 
that are introducing noise into my analysis and focus on the system-
ic shocks. The final subset sample of bank stock returns contains 
10,338 total observations for all 351 banks from 2007Q1-2009Q1.
Table 1 Panel B shows summary statistics for bank stock returns. 
This also includes Ri – Rf, the excess return on bank stocks. It is 
clear that the identifiable important trends, just like those of the 
repo haircut data, are in line with the timeline of the Crisis. In the 
first half of 2007, the normal state of affairs is that the average bank 
stock returns are zero. Just like the repo haircut trends, there is a 
change when the Crisis hits. There are decreases in the average 
bank stock returns in the second half of 2007, but the larger de-
creases are in 2008.
The repo market and stock market are similar as they both have 
heavy trading and are therefore characterized as liquid. The Secu-
rities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) report-
ed that the average daily trading volume in the repo market was 
about $7.11 trillion in 2008, compared with the New York Stock 
Exchange’s reported average daily trading volume of about $80 bil-
lion in 2008.14 I illustrate the relationship between the repo market 
and the stock market during the Financial Crisis in Figure 3. The 
display is of the average bank stock returns versus the Repo-Hair-
cut Index and appears to show a divergent relationship between the 
two. Both measures experience a period of stability near zero until 
the beginning of the second half of 2007 when the first signal of 
danger arose. At this point, they gradually diverge until the average 
bank stock returns reaches -16.22 percent and the Repo-Haircut In-
dex reaches 48.89 percent on approximately September 15, 2008, 
the peak of the Crisis. On this day, the bankruptcy-court filing of 
Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. lead to a daily point plunge of the 
Dow Jones Industrial Average, falling 504.48 points, and heralded 
the near collapse of the interbank market in the subsequent weeks 
(Craig et al. 2008).15 It is important to note that a financial crisis can 
take many forms, including a banking/credit panic or a stock mar-
ket crash; but it differs from a recession, which is often the result 
of such a crisis.
Total Reserve Balances Data
Another data source is Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED), 
14 The SIFMA number includes repo and reverse repo; half of $7.11 trillion 
would be $3.56 trillion (2008).
15 Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) is a price-weighted index that tracks 
30 large, publicly-owned blue chip companies trading on the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) and the NASDAQ (Ganti 2020).
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Figure 3. Average Bank Stock Returns Versus Repo-Haircut Index. The 
average bank stock returns and the Repo-Haircut Index have a divergent 
relationship.
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Figure 4. Total Reserve Balances ($ Billions). Total reserve balances 
experience an upsurge. 
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which has more than 500,000 economic time series from 87 sourc-
es. The research division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
maintains this publicly available database. It covers banking, busi-
ness/fiscal, consumer price indexes, employment and population, 
exchange rates, gross domestic product, interest rates, monetary 
aggregates, producer price indexes, reserves and monetary base, 
U.S. trade and international transactions, and U.S. financial data.
The initial data was gathered regarding the independent variable 
of interest, total reserve balances maintained with Federal Reserve 
banks. The initial 108 observations have a weekly frequency from 
2007Q1 through 2009Q1. The total reserve balances maintained 
is the amount of balances institutions hold in accounts at Federal 
Reserves Banks that are available to satisfy reserve requirements; 
historically, this series excluded balances held in a reserve account 
for contractual clearing purposes. One indication of the quality of 
the data is its reliable source. The data has a few limitations: it is 
aggregated for all banks instead of data on a granular bank by bank 
basis; reserve computation and maintenance periods are bi-weekly, 
not weekly, and values repeat for 2 consecutive weeks; and all other 
datasets must be trimmed to sync the dates of observations. Due to 
the bi-weekly data limitation, I subset the data for bi-weekly obser-
vations and end up with 54 observations.
Table 1 Panel C displays summary statistics for total reserve bal-
ances. Interestingly, the magnitude at which the average total re-
serve balances are increasing from the first half of 2007 to the 
second half of 2007 is becoming smaller, from 4 percent to 2 per-
cent. However, all of 2008 sees a sharp increase to 36 percent. This 
pattern is explained by the complementary relationship between 
the main elements of traditional banking and securitized banking. 
First, in traditional banking, reserves are regulated by requiring a 
fraction of deposits to be held in reserve to promote bank solvency 
and in emergencies these reserves can be replenished by borrowing 
from the central bank. In securitized banking, the analogue is repo 
haircuts in which counterparties set minimal levels of banks’ assets 
in reserve when they borrow money through repo markets and no 
borrowing is available from the central bank. Second, deposit in-
surance is a government guarantee to pay depositors in the event 
of default; the analogue is collateral (i.e. cash treasury securities, 
loans, and securitized bonds) that the investor keeps if the bank 
defaults on the repurchase agreement. Third, deposit rates can be 
increased to attract deposits (i.e. cash) when reserves are low; the 
analogue is repo rates that can be raised to attract counterparties 
when funds are low. Finally, loans held on the balance sheet are the 
result of lent out cash raised; the analogue is loans repackaged and 
resold as securitized bonds when funds are lent out temporarily.
Figure 4 bridges the total reserve balances maintained with Fed-
eral Reserve banks. Total reserve balances held at the Federal 
Reserve include required reserves and any excess reserves that 
depository institutions choose to hold on top of the required re-
serves.16 The figure shows that: (1) total reserve balances waver 
around $10,000,000,000 pre-Crisis; but (2), total reserve balances 
skyrocket to a max of $862,540,000,000 at the heart of the Crisis. 
The upsurge represents the implementation of the Emergency Eco-
16 See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2020a) for a descrip-
tion of reserve requirements and how they are calculated.
nomic Stabilization Act of 2008, which moved up by three years 
the effective date of the Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act 
of 2006. On October 6, 2008, the legislation announced that the 
Federal Reserve would begin to pay interest on depository institu-
tions’ required and excess reserve balances (Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System 2008). Overall, the figure shows 
that this was important for monetary policy because the Federal 
Reserve’s various liquidity facilities initiated during the Financial 
Crisis caused upward pressure on excess reserves and placed down-
ward pressure on the Federal funds rate.17 
Market Rate of Return and Risk-Free Rate of Return Data
In addition, Kenneth R. French is the publicly available data source 
for the Fama/French 3 Research Factors used in my regression 
analysis. Kenneth R. French is the Roth Family Distinguished Pro-
fessor of Finance at the Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Col-
lege. He is an expert on the behavior of security prices and invest-
ment strategies. He and co-author Eugene F. Fama are well known 
for their research into the value effect and the three-factor model. 
Kenneth R. French provides a detailed description of the factor 
construction regarding the control variable of interest, the market 
rate of return minus the risk-free rate of return (Rm – Rf), which 
is technically the market factor. Rm – Rf, the excess return on the 
market, is the value-weight return of all CRSP firms incorporated 
in the U.S. and listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ that have 
a CRSP share code of 10 or 11 at the beginning of month t, good 
shares and price data at the beginning of t, and good return data for 
t minus the one-month Treasury bill rate (from Ibbotson Associ-
ates).18 The initial data on Rm – Rf includes a total of 108 observa-
tions on a weekly basis over a period from 2007Q1-2009Q1. The 
strength of the data is the description of the underlying construction 
of the market factor; but, its limitation is that there is no theoretical 
justification for the successful use of Rm – Rf as a risk factor in 
predicting the returns on stocks.
I manually constructed the bi-weekly Rm – Rf market factor. In 
order to do so, I ensure the timing with the final repo haircut data 
is correct. Using weekly data from the Fama/French 3 Research 
Factors from 2007Q1-2009Q1, I add back Rf to Rm – Rf to extract 
absolute values for Rm and Rf. Next, I compound the weekly into 
bi-weekly rates and subtract Rf from Rm. Thus, the final 54 obser-
vations of Rm – Rf accurately reflect the bi-weekly excess return 
on the market by way of compounding and is in line with the final 
repo haircut sample dates.
Table 1 Panel D gives summary statistics for Rm – Rf in the up 
and down market conditions. Positive market excess returns are 48 
percent (26 of 54 weeks) of the observations. In up market condi-
tions, Rm – Rf standard deviations are marginally lower than in 
down market conditions. Before the Crisis, the average Rm – Rf 
is 1 percent; in the Crisis period, the average Rm – Rf decrease 
to -2 percent. Even though the magnitude of the average Rm – Rf 
is small and the change between series is slight, the percent ob-
17 To learn more about the Federal Reserve’s credit and liquidity programs and 
the balance sheet, go to Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2017).
18 See Fama and French (1993), “Common Risk Factors in the Returns on Stocks 
and Bonds”, for a complete description of the factor returns.
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servations actually have back and forth fluctuations between -6.99 
to 5.73 from 2007Q1 through 2008Q3 and -25.88 to 10.20 from 
2008Q4 through 2009Q1, as shown in Figure 5.
Most important, the five common risk factors, one stock market 
factor being the overall market factor, seem to explain average re-
turns on stocks and bonds (Fama and French 1993). Figure 6 com-
pares the excess return on the market (Rm – Rf) versus the average 
bank stock returns. The result documents how both measures move 
in tandem throughout the timeline of the Crisis. For example, both 
Rm – Rf and the average bank stock returns see a point plunge of 
22.70 and 21.92 percentage points from -3.18 to -25.88 percent and 
5.70 to -16.22 percent, respectively, at approximately the beginning 
of 2008Q4.
Empirical Model
Repo haircuts are thought to have had many contagious external 
systemic effects during the Financial Crisis; however, the econom-
ics literature has focused on how repo haircuts internally affected 
the shadow banking system by driving the run on repo. To estimate 
the effect of repo haircuts on the external systems, I run a linear 
model regression of repo haircuts on the 9 different categories of 
asset classes of collateral on the return of bank stocks in the tradi-
tional banking system. The identifying assumption of the one-fac-
tor linear model regression is that bank stock returns are unlikely 
to be driving the effects in the repo market as repo haircuts are 
slow moving compared to bank stock returns and the haircut data 
effects are driven by broker dealer networks in the shadow banking 
system. Also, I am able to find correlation rather than causation in 
my empirical results because my analysis is only able to address 
co-movements of repo haircuts on bank stock returns without a 
structural model. The one-factor linear model regression to esti-
mate this effect is specified as:
where t is time on a bi-weekly time index, Ri – Rfi,t is the excess 
bank stock returns on bank i at time t, α0 is a constant, H1t through 
H9t are the repo haircuts for the 9 different categories of asset class-
es of collateral, TotalReservest is the total reserve balances main-
tained with Federal Reserve banks, and Rm – Rft  is the excess 
market return. Note, H1 through H9 are defined, in order, as follows: 
BBB+/A Corporates, AA-AAA Corporates, A-AAA ABS-Auto/
CC/SL (auto/credit cards/student loans), AA-AAA ABS-RMBS/
CMBS, <AA ABS-RMBS/CMBS, Unpriced ABS/MBS/All Sub-
Prime, AA-AAA CLO, AA-AAA CDO, and Unpriced CLO/CDO. 
Since repo haircuts are slow moving and they significantly co-move 
and vary over my time period, I take first differences of Equation 
1 and normalize all changes by their level in the previous period:
where the ∆ prefix indicates the absolute change of the variable. 
Throughout my analysis, all references to “changes” will be “abso-
lute changes”, aside from ∆TotalReservest, which is “percentage 
change”.
I include the market factor (Rm – Rf) as a control variable because 
fluctuations that may vary by market during the Financial Crisis 
could affect stock prices and thus bank stock returns. Also, Rm – Rf 
is the main driving factor of stock returns in the Fama and French 
Three-Factor Model. The other two research factors are firm size 
(SMB: “small minus big”) and book to market equity (HML: “high 
minus low”). Fama and French (1993) confirm this decision: “not 
surprisingly, the excess return on the market portfolio of stocks, 
Rm – Rf, captures more common variation in stock returns than the 
term-structure factors”. The Fama and French Three-Factor Model 
is an asset pricing model that expands on the capital asset pric-
ing model (CAPM) by adding size risk and value risk factors to 
the market risk factor in CAPM.19 This enhanced model considers 
19 The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) describes the relationship between 
systematic risk and expected return for assets, particularly stocks. CAPM is widely 
used throughout finance for pricing risky securities and generating expected returns 
for assets given the risk of those assets and cost of capital.
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Figure 5. Excess Return on Market (Rm – Rf). Rm – Rf fluctuates back 
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the fact that value and small-cap stocks outperform markets on a 
regular basis; by including these two additional factors, the model 
adjusts for this outperforming tendency, which is thought to make 
it a better tool for evaluating manager performance. While I don’t 
incorporate SMB or HML into my regression analysis, I do add to-
tal reserve balances as an additional independent variable. I believe 
this additional variable co-moves with bank stock returns during 
the Crisis for reasons I aim to understand further in my analysis.
Since I am working with the norm of finance data dimensionality in 
panel form, it is important that I adjust standard errors for correla-
tion either across firms or across time in my regression estimations 
to enhance the statistical reliability of my results. In an ideal linear 
model regression on panel data, the assumption is that there are 
independent and identically distributed (i.d.d.) random variables.20 
However, in a finance panel, it is unlikely for the residuals to be 
uncorrelated either across time or across firms (Thompson 2011). 
Since systemic shocks in the finance industry can cause market 
wide co-movement across all bank stock returns, I cluster the stan-
dard errors by company to account for the fact that systemic shocks 
will produce correlation between firms at specific points in time 
(Thompson 2011). The econometrics approach I use to account for 
this challenge is a version of the Fama-MacBeth regression.
The Fama-MacBeth two-step regression is a practical way of test-
ing how risk factors describe portfolio or asset returns. The goal is 
to find the premium from exposure to these factors. In the first step, 
each portfolio’s return is regressed against one or more factor time 
series to determine how exposed it is to each one (the “factor expo-
sures”). In the second step, the cross-section of portfolio returns is 
regressed against the factor exposures, at each time step, to give a 
time series of risk premia coefficients for each factor. The insight of 
Fama-MacBeth is to then average these coefficients, once for each 
factor, to give the premium expected for a unit exposure to each 
risk factor over time (Fama and MacBeth 1973).21 Since the gran-
20 A common assumption about data produced by complex systems that often 
exhibit fluctuations and variability is that observations are independent and iden-
tically distributed (i.d.d.). i.d.d. means that in a given a set of data {xi}, each of 
these xi observations is an independent draw from a fixed (“stationary”) probabi-
listic model. Independence means that Pr(x1) and Pr(x2) = Pr(x1) Pr(x2). That is, the 
probability of observing two values x1 and x2 is simply the probability of observing 
x1 multiplied by the probability of observing x2. This implies what is called condi-
tional independence, Pr(x2 | x1) = Pr(x2).
21 See (Fama and MacBeth 1973) for the empirical tests. In equation form, for n 
portfolio or asset returns and m factors, in the first step the factor exposure ßs are 
obtained by calculating n regressions, each one on m factors (each equation in the 
following represents a regression):
where Ri,t is the return of portfolio or asset i (n total) at time t, Fj,t is the factor j 
(m total) at time t, βi,Fm are the factor exposures, or loadings, that describe how 
returns are exposed to the factors, and t goes from 1 through T. Notice that each re-
gression uses the same factors F, because the purpose is to determine the exposure 
of each portfolio’s return to a given set of factors.
The second step is to compute T cross-sectional regressions of the returns on the 
m estimates of the ßs (call then ) calculated from the first step. Notice that each 
regression uses the same ßs from the first step, because now the goal is the expo-
ularity of the repo haircut and total reserve balances data is limited 
and does not vary across banks, I run the second step by regressing 
bank stock returns against repo haircuts at each company, rather 
than time, step.
While there is a small literature on sale and repurchase agreement 
haircuts due to limited official statistics on the overall size of the 
repo market and haircuts, this paper in essence extends and refines 
Gorton and Metrick’s “Securitized Banking and Run on Repo” 
study from 2009. They discover that concerns about the liquidity 
of markets for the bonds used as collateral led to increases in repo 
haircuts (Gorton and Metrick 2009). While I also use the same repo 
haircut dataset to find that the Panic of 2007-2008 transpired as in-
creasing haircuts composed a run on repo at the nexus of the Crisis, 
my study is not identical; it has a few differentiating factors that 
explain the novelty of my research and the differing results:
• I address one question not explored in the 2009 study by Gor-
ton and Metrick: Do repo haircut effects, subsequently a run on 
repo, in the securitized banking system differ from those in the 
traditional banking system (measured via bank stock returns) 
in how they affect financing performance during the Financial 
Crisis?
• Bank stock returns are on the left-hand side of the equation, 
rather than repo haircuts, and they depend on repo haircuts on 
the right-hand side, rather than the ABX index, a proxy for 
fundamentals in the subprime mortgage market; the LIB-OIS, 
the spread between the LIBOR rate (for unsecured interbank 
borrowing), and OIS, the rate on an overnight interest swap (a 
proxy for the risk-free rate); VOL, the average absolute change 
in spreads over a future period of time (a proxy for expected 
volatility); and X, a vector of control variables.
These two points are interesting for many reasons. As mentioned 
earlier, the 2007-2009 Financial Crisis was special because it was 
a run on repo in the securitized banking system, instead of in the 
traditional banking system, and these securitized banking activities 
were central to the operations of former investment banks while 
supplementing traditional banking activities of commercial banks. 
One inference deducted from these dynamics is how capital affects 
a bank’s performance and how these effects vary across banking 
crises, market crises, and normal times. One piece of literature re-
garding this topic is Berger and Bouwman’s 2013 study. The find-
ings from this paper show that: (1) capital helps small banks to 
increase their probability of survival and market share at all times 
sure of the n returns to the m factor loadings over time:
where the returns R are the same as those in Equation (1), γ are regression coeffi-
cients that are later used to calculate the risk premium for each factor, and in each 
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(during banking crises, market crises, and normal times) and (2) 
capital enhances the performance of medium and large banks pri-
marily during banking crises (Berger and Bouwman 2013). So, 
changes in capital can result in gains or losses in market share that 
may have significant impacts on a company’s stock performance.
RESULTS
Table 2 summarizes Equation 2’s one-factor linear model regres-
sion results with repo haircuts, total reserves, and Rm – Rf re-
gressed on bank stock returns. The coefficient estimates show that 
bank stock returns are significantly correlated to total reserves, Rm 
– Rf, and all 9 of the different categories of asset classes of col-
lateral repo haircuts: BBB+/A Corporates, AA-AAA Corporates, 
A-AAA ABS-Auto/CC/SL (auto/credit cards/student loans), AA-
AAA ABS-RMBS/CMBS, <AA ABS-RMBS/CMBS, Unpriced 
ABS/MBS/All Sub-Prime, AA-AAA CLO, AA-AAA CDO, and 
Unpriced CLO/CDO. The statistically significant variables hold 
explanatory power for the path of the run on repo traced from the 
securitized banking system to the traditional banking system mea-
sured via bank stock returns.
Rows 2 through 10 in Table 2 display the results of the repo haircut 
variables. The partial slope coefficient for both BBB+/A Corporates 
and AA-AAA Corporates is negative and significant at the 1 percent 
level; an increase in BBB+/A Corporates or AA-AAA Corporates 
repo haircuts of one percentage point is associated with a decrease 
of 7.92 percentage points of bank stock returns, holding the other 
variables constant. Interestingly, the effect of the investment-grade 
corporate bonds on bank stock returns is greater in magnitude to 
the majority of the structured products, indicating the balance sheet 
bond rating forecasting inequalities in stock returns consistent with 
the findings of Adrian, Etula, and Muir (2014). Banks holding more 
higher rated bonds on their balance sheets have inherently greater 
exposure to the associated risk profiles that possess predictive pow-
er of stock returns than banks holding lower rated bonds.
Holding all other variables constant, an A-AAA ABS-Auto/CC/
SL repo haircut increase is correlated to a 1.00 percentage point 
decrease in bank stock returns. An increase in repo haircuts on AA-
AAA ABS-RMBS/CMBS is associated with bank stock returns 
decreasing by 7.03 percentage points, holding the other variables 
constant. AA-AAA CLO repo haircuts affect bank stock returns 
with a resulting 1.43 percentage points decrease, holding constant 
the other variables. Unpriced CLO/CDO repo haircut increases, 
holding the other variables constant, are related to 1.73 percentage 
point bank stock return decreases. Surprisingly, <AA ABS-RMBS/
CMBS, Unpriced ABS/MBS/All Sub-Prime, and AA-AAA CDO 
are positively correlated with bank stock returns.
Row 11 of Table 2 displays the results of the total reserves variable. 
The partial slope coefficient for total reserves is positive and sig-
nificant at the 1 percent level; an increase in total reserves of one 
percentage point is associated with an increase of 0.06 percentage 
point of bank stock returns, holding the other variables constant. 
Row 12 of Table 2 displays the results of the control variable. The 
coefficient on Rm – Rf is significant at the 1 percent level. An in-
Table 2. Repo Haircuts Regression Results. For bank stock returns, I estimate Equation 2 using bi-weekly data from January 3, 2007 to January 
21, 2009. ∆H1 through ∆H9 is the absolute change of the repo haircut on the asset class of collateral, respectively: BBB+/A Corporates, AA-AAA 
Corporates, A-AAA ABS-Auto/CC/SL (auto/credit cards/student loans), AA-AAA ABS-RMBS/CMBS, <AA ABS-RMBS/CMBS, Unpriced ABS/MBS/All 
Sub-Prime, AA-AAA CLO, AA-AAA CDO, and Unpriced CLO/CDO. ∆TotalReserves is the percentage change of the total reserve balances main-
tained with Federal Reserve banks. Rm-Rf is the excess return on the market. t- statistics are given in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
The last row reports p-values for the independent variables. The samples are restricted to observations that are used in the one-factor linear model 
regression. * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
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crease in Rm – Rf is associated with an increase of 0.92 percentage 
point on bank stock returns, holding the other variables constant.
As a contribution to the economics literature, which concludes that 
repo haircuts have internal negative effects on the shadow banking 
system by driving the run on repo, I find a significant negative ex-
ternal effect of repo haircuts on the traditional banking system by 
driving the decline in bank stock returns.
CONCLUSION
This paper investigates what the effect of repo haircuts are on bank 
stock returns during the Financial Crisis. The abundance of signifi-
cant effects of repo haircuts on bank stock returns suggests that the 
effect of repo haircuts on the traditional banking system has been 
understated in previous literature due to a gap in comprehensive 
haircut data. The one-factor linear model regression results of the 
bank stock returns effects of repo haircuts find significant negative 
coefficients on BBB+/A Corporates, AA-AAA Corporates, A-AAA 
ABS-Auto/CC/SL, AA-AAA ABS-RMBS/CMBS, AA-AAA CLO, 
and Unpriced CLO/CDO, along with significant positive coeffi-
cients on <AA ABS-RMBS/CMBS, Unpriced ABS/MBS/All Sub-
Prime, AA-AAA CDO, total reserves, and Rm – Rf, suggesting the 
former are positive and the latter are negative important factors af-
fecting bank stock returns.
The fundamental assumption of this paper’s narrative is that bank 
stock returns are unlikely to be driving the effects in the repo mar-
ket. For this identifying assumption of the one-factor linear model 
regression to be the case, it must be that the effect of repo haircuts 
on bank stock returns is more robust than the reverse. It is surely 
the case as repo haircuts are slow moving compared to bank stock 
returns and the haircut data effects are driven by broker dealer net-
works in the shadow banking system. Further, haircuts exist due to 
sequential transactions (i.e. trading chains) and the haircut size is a 
function of (1) the default probabilities of the borrower, (2) the li-
quidity needs of the lender, (3) the default probability of the lender 
in a subsequent repo transaction, and (4) the information sensitivity 
of the collateral (Dang, Gorton, and Holmström 2010b). Howev-
er, this assumption can be clarified through a statistical robustness 
check: (1) regress bank stock returnst on repo haircutst (to find 
significant correlation), (2) regress bank stock returns +1 on repo 
haircutst (to find significant correlation given repo traders can’t 
know today bank stock returns tomorrow and bank stock returns 
tomorrow can’t affect repo haircuts today), (3) regress repo hair-
cutst+1 on bank stock returnst (to find insignificant correlation). 
If these 3 checks are true, then there is evidence that the causality 
flows from repo haircuts to bank stock returns, not vice versa.
The linear model regression generates some results consistent with 
previous literature and others that differ slightly, offering import-
ant implications for policy regarding repos. The preceding analysis 
suggests that the line between information sensitivity and insen-
sitivity has moved because of the subprime shock (i.e. previously 
information-insensitive tranches are now sensitive). This case im-
plies policies with the goal to design securities, including debt and 
securitization, such that it does not pay to speculate in these bonds. 
For example, when the asymmetric information about the holders 
of subprime risks becomes pressing, increasing haircuts provides a 
way to recreate (through retranching) information-insensitive debt 
(Dang, Gorton, and Holmström 2010a, 2010b). Consequently, pol-
icymakers should be mindful of this in their dealings with repos.
The findings regarding differences in securitized banking system 
and traditional banking system financing performance following 
increased haircuts during the Financial Crisis are interesting. The 
most relevant debate for academics, financiers, and politicians, and 
the main motivation for this paper, is whether there is an under-
lying economic relationship causing the co-movement between 
repo haircuts and bank stock returns, where there really should be 
zero relationship. The answer to this question has important pol-
icy implications regarding the Federal Reserve’s continuous role 
in monitoring repo infrastructure and recommending regulatory 
reforms to ensure these markets remain stable sources of funding 
during periods of market stress. Future research could focus on ei-
ther testing my identifying assumption that bank stock returns are 
unlikely to be causing the effects in the repo market or exploring 
a contemporaneous factor not captured in the market factor that is 
driving the co-movement of repo haircuts and bank stock returns 
by including more relevant control variables to tease out the effect 
of repo haircuts.
APPENDIX: GLOSSARY
AA-AAA ABS RMBS/CMBS: Residential mortgage-backed se-
curity (RMBS) or commercial mortgage-backed security (CMBS) 
with ratings between AA and AAA, inclusive.
<AA ABS RMBS-CMBS: Residential mortgage-backed security 
(RMBS) or commercial mortgage-backed security (CMBS) with 
ratings between AA and AAA, inclusive.
AA-AAA CDO: Collateralized debt obligations (CDO) with rat-
ings between AA and AAA, inclusive.
AA-AAA CLO: Collateralized loan obligations (CDO) with rat-
ings between AA and AAA, inclusive.
AA-AAA Corporates: Corporate bonds rated between AA and 
AAA, inclusive.
A-AAA ABS Auto/CC/SL: Asset-backed securities (ABS) com-
prised of auto loans, credit-card receivables, or student loans, with 
ratings between A and AAA, inclusive.
BBB+/A Corporates: Corporate bonds rated between BBB+ and 
A, inclusive.
Unpriced ABS/MBS, All Subprime: All tranches of ABS, MBS 
and all subprime securitized bonds which do not have public pric-
ing posted on Bloomberg or Reuters (two news services used by 
traders)
Unpriced CDO/CLO: All tranches of CDO and CLO securitized 
bonds which do not have public pricing posted on Bloomberg or 
Reuters (two news services used by traders)
Repo-Haircut Index: The equal-weighted average haircut for all 
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nine of the asset classes. Haircuts of 100 percent (= no trade) are 
included in this average.
Bank Stock Returns: A return is the change in the total value of an 
investment in a common stock over some period of time per dollar 
of initial investment.
Total Reserve Balances: Total reserve balances maintained with 
Federal Reserve banks is the amount of balances institutions hold 
in accounts at Federal Reserve Banks that are available to satisfy 
reserve requirements. The units are in millions of dollars and not 
seasonally adjusted.
Rm – Rf: Rm – Rf, the excess return on the market, is the val-
ue-weight return of all CRSP firms incorporated in the U.S. and 
listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ that have a CRSP share 
code of 10 or 11 at the beginning of month t, good shares and price 
data at the beginning of t, and good return data for t minus the one-
month Treasury bill rate (from Ibbotson Associates).
Ri – Rf: Ri – Rf is the excess return on the bank stock.
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